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Abstract 
 
Contributing to interpretations of the governance geographies of austerity, 
the paper explains how, why and in what forms austerity states are 
constructed by actors in particular political-economic contexts and 
geographical and temporal settings, how and by whom they are articulated 
and pursued, and how they are worked through public policy and 
institutional and territorial architectures. Empirically, the focus is explaining 
the UK Government and its abolition and closure of the Regional 
Development Agencies in England. First, a more qualitative and plural 
conception of austerity states is developed to question singular and/or 
monolithic notions of state types and their transitions, and to better reflect 
the particularities of how state projects are configured and unfolded within 
political-economic variegations of capitalism. Second, a more geographically 
sensitive approach and appreciation of (re)scaling are detailed to incorporate 
and extend beyond the predominantly national frame deployed in current 
accounts. Last, a historically literate interpretation of institutional 
dismantling is advanced better to explain the politics and restructuring of 
institutional landscapes by actors within austerity states.    
 
 
 
  
 2 
1. Introduction 
Austerity has become the leitmotif of the period following the global 
financial crisis and ‘Great Recession’ since 2008 (Blyth 2013, Smaghi 2013). 
The international rise of what Schäfer and Streeck (2013: 9-10) term the 
“austerity or consolidation state” is apparent. The restructuring of the roles, 
rationales, institutional and territorial architectures of states has been 
integral in the attempts of actors in governments internationally to respond 
to economic shocks, downturn and recovery, financial system fragility and 
volatility, rising levels of private and public indebtedness, sovereign debt 
crises, and international geopolitical-economic turbulence. Specific actors in 
governments and international institutions have articulated particular 
diagnoses of such ills and their cures including: the European Union, 
European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund-led bail-out 
programmes imposed in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Fraser et al. 2013), 
deficit reduction in the UK (Kitson et al. 2011), and efforts to combine fiscal 
tightening and stimulus in America (Young and Sobel 2011) and France 
(Holland and Portes 2013). 
 
Amidst these tumultuous times, research is seeking to conceptualise and 
interpret the governance geographies of austerity (see, for example, Donald 
et al. 2014, Hadjimichalis 2011, Jones 2014, Kitson et al. 2011, Peck 2012). 
Advancing this agenda, the purpose here is to address gaps in understanding 
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and strengthen conceptual frameworks and theoretical explanations of how, 
why and in what forms austerity states are constructed by actors in particular 
political-economic contexts and geographical and temporal settings, how 
and by whom they are articulated and pursued, and how they are worked 
through public policy areas and their institutional and territorial 
architectures. The empirical focus is explaining the austerity state initiated 
and configured by actors in the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government in the UK from 2010 and its abolition and closure of 
the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) responsible for economic 
development in England from the late 1990s.    
 
The specific contributions are threefold. First, a more qualitative and plural 
conception of austerity states is developed to question singular and/or 
monolithic notions of state types and their transitions, and better reflect the 
particularities of how such state projects are constructed by actors and 
unfolded within specific geographical political-economic variegations of 
capitalism. Particular austerity states are somewhat fluid, unstable and 
temporary – even at times contingent – political projects configured in 
certain spatial and temporal settings by multiple actors at different 
institutional and geographical levels through their construction of discursive 
and often contested rationales, and their uneven, partial and messy attempts 
to implement them. Second, a more geographically sensitive approach to 
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austerity and appreciation of (re)scaling are detailed to incorporate and 
extend beyond the predominantly national frame deployed in current 
accounts. Austerity states are unfolding in geographically uneven ways 
across territorial scales and relational networks, involving multiple actors 
and multi-scalar articulations over time and space. Last, a historically literate 
interpretation of institutional dismantling is advanced better to explain the 
politics and restructuring of institutional landscapes by actors within 
austerity states. Notions of straightforward and tidy transitions between 
institutional and territorial architectures are questioned as the histories of 
institutional establishment and elements of change and continuity persist 
and intertwine, establishing legacies and ramifications that pattern 
institutional evolution and emergence.   
 
 
2. Austerity states, institutional dismantling and the governance of 
sub-national economic development 
While austerity has become pervasive internationally as a treatment for 
economic recovery and reform in post-crisis states (Kitson et al. 2011), 
actors in governments have constructed and are enacting particular versions 
of austerity projects, sometimes with the involvement of external and 
supranational institutions. Although varied in their articulation and 
implementation, some common features of austerity are apparent across 
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different geographical, temporal and political-economic settings 
internationally: rapid reduction of public debt and deficits through reducing 
public expenditure and/or raising taxes; the construction of narratives of 
fiscal consolidation and stability to maintain or enhance national credit 
ratings and instil international investor community confidence in sovereign 
debt; state restructuring and reorganisation of its institutional and territorial 
apparatus, policies, public services and employment; public sector wage 
freezes and/or reductions and pension reforms; and, echoing ‘crowding-out’ 
arguments (Bacon and Eltis 1976), reducing the relative size of the state in 
the economy to enable the private sector to generate investment and jobs 
for economic growth and recovery (Hadjimichalis 2011, Harvey 2010, 
Kitson et al. 2011, Schäfer and Streeck 2013, Whitfield 2013). 
 
The form, purpose and character of states has changed in the emergent 
context toward the “austerity” or “consolidation” state: 
 
governments, at the prodding of ‘financial markets’, jointly try to turn 
the tax and debt state that existed before 2008 into an austerity or 
consolidation state defined by balanced budgets and a (gradual) decline 
in public indebtedness (Schäfer and Streeck 2013: 9-10). 
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Schäfer and Streeck (2013) explain that two constituencies have emerged to 
enable and entrench the austerity state. First is the ‘people’ who are reluctant 
to pay more taxes, even for higher quality public provision, and cede more 
fiscal power to states. The people constituency is focused at the national 
level and comprises citizens as voters in periodic elections, shaping public 
opinion, loyal to particular political groupings, and broadly satisfied with 
levels of public services. The second constituency is the ‘markets’. This 
grouping is international and comprises investors and creditors with claims 
on state and other assets, engaged in continual auctions of buying and 
selling, and sensitive to interest rates, confidence and state debt levels and 
service. In Schäfer and Streeck’s (2013: 17) view, the people and markets 
have reinforced the government and politics of “long-term institutionalized 
policies of austerity”.  
 
Differing interpretations have emerged in geographical readings of the 
austerity state and its governance. For Harvey (2010), it represents the 
reinforcement of the neoliberal governance of capital accumulation, marked 
by fiscal crises of the state and further reductions in the social wage. Indeed, 
following the ‘Great Recession’, states are interpreted as having 
reconstructed and accelerated neoliberalisation, redoubling its intensity and 
reach through state restructuring, bank bail-outs, partial and wholesale 
nationalisations, and stimulus programmes (Peck 2012). Crouch (2011: 115) 
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sees the emergence of “privatised Keynesianism” after the economic crisis 
of the early 1970s in advanced economies, characterised by extensive state 
support of deregulated finance and private debt to support consumption, 
and bemoans the “strange non-death” (Crouch 2011: vii) of neoliberalism 
following the late 2000s crisis and recession. Further rounds of state 
rescaling are seen as being unleashed in the wake of the crisis (Lobao et al. 
2009), unfolding in ways distinctive from previous eras characterised by 
decentralisation from national to sub-national levels (Brenner 2004). 
 
Given that work theorising austerity and specifically the governance 
geographies of austerity states is in its infancy (Donald et al. 2014), several 
key issues warrant attention. First, certain accounts have veered toward 
framing a linear transition from a tax and debt state to an austerity or 
consolidation state. While Schäfer and Streeck (2013: 9) acknowledge the 
role of agency and difficulties in government actors “trying to turn” old into 
new state forms, this approach raises several concerns. It risks treating each 
state conception as a singular and/or monolithic entity and gives limited 
attention to the blurring and/or overlaps between state types. And, it pays 
insufficient attention to the extent, nature, direction, timing and geographies 
of any transition in state forms. A way of addressing such points lies in the 
‘qualitative state’ (Block 1994). Marking a break with traditional 
‘quantitative’ views of the extent of state intervention in the economy, the 
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‘qualitative’ reading interprets “a complex and heterogeneous state apparatus 
…engaged in constant interplay with non-state institutions and agents, 
including those from other nations, in an irresolvable contest over 
accumulation” (O’Neill 1997: 290). The qualitative state focuses upon 
historical evolutions in the forms, nature, purposes and consequences of 
state actors and agency as well as their roles, strategies, capacities, resources, 
structures and (re)organisation – all of which are inescapably spatial (Pike 
and Tomaney 2009).  
 
Conceiving of the qualitative state frames a plural rather than singular 
conception of austerity states, reflecting their characteristic features as well 
as the particularities of their construction by actors, emergence and 
unfolding within specific geographical and temporal variegations of 
capitalism (Peck and Theodore 2007). Whereby generalised and even 
paradigmatic ideas such as austerity get translated, configured and mobilised 
in fluid, unstable and temporary political projects and policy programmes by 
actors in particular national and institutional political-economic contexts 
(Kus 2006). The qualitative state focuses analysis and explanation upon how 
the multiple actors – what Jones et al. (2004: 89) term “state personnel” – 
involved at different institutional and geographical levels and in relational 
networks diagnose state problems and conceive of austerity as the solution, 
articulate its rationales and priorities, mobilise coalitions of state as well as 
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non-state actors (e.g. commentators, journalists, policy analysts) to support 
and do its work, communicate it to various audiences, and try to deliver it 
through individual and institutional agency and policy. Rather than 
conceiving of some kind of linear and/or mechanical transition toward any 
wholly new state type, the central tasks are interpreting and explaining the 
degree, nature, timing and geographies of the emergence and governance of 
austerity states. 
 
Second, the emergence of austerity states has been dominated by analysis 
based on the national frame of the nation state. Echoing the 
“methodological nationalism” of the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approach 
(Peck and Theodore 2007: 763), work has primarily focused upon national 
governments, especially in Europe (see, for example, Schäfer and Streeck 
2013). Limited attention has been given to the sub-national scale and then 
only to the local state (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). This national concern 
is vital but risks overlooking the uneven geographical unfolding and 
implications of austerity states in and across other geographical scales and 
relational networks. While much of the locus of authority and power to 
construct and enact austerity may reside amongst actors in the governing 
party and state apparatus at the national level, explaining the ways in which 
actors articulate, mediate and work through the national together with other 
territorial levels and relational circuits of the state are critically important. 
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Such governance geographies of austerity are being acknowledged in the 
formative literature. In more spatially sensitive work, cities and urbanism 
have been the focus to date (Davidson and Ward 2014, Donald et al. 2014, 
Peck 2012), although other local and regional scales of analysis are emerging 
(Beatty and Fothergill 2014, Clarke and Cochrane 2013, Kitson et al. 2011). 
Evidence suggests:  
 
austerity policies have played out at multiple scales, but it seems that 
this current round of austerity is peculiarly local in nature...broader 
national policies have been translated into a diverse landscape of 
austerity with some cities and regions more affected than others 
(Donald et al. 2014: 5, 4).  
 
Peck (2012: 628), for example, has documented the geographical 
differentiation of the “extreme economy” of austerity at the sub-national 
scale of city, local and state governments in the US. Engaging the qualitative 
and plural conception of austerity states can benefit from such a 
geographically sensitive approach, appreciative of (re)scaling, that 
incorporates, complements and extends beyond the national frame. 
 
Third, work is only just beginning to analyse the ways in which and 
implications of how actors in austerity states have sought to engage with 
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existing state forms in efforts to contract or shrink the state, rationalising its 
role, purpose and structures through institutional restructuring (Flinders and 
Skelcher 2012, Tonkiss and Skelcher 2015). Existing work has focused on 
national level welfare state reform (Streeck and Thelen 2005), directing 
attention to short and long-term expenditure reductions, programme and 
spending reorganisation, and systemic and programme retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994). Processes of dismantling can be discerned through which 
state institutional arrangements are abolished, closed down and removed 
from the landscape through the agency of state and, often, non-state actors 
(Pike et al. 2015). Dismantling involves substantial effort, time, resources 
and (un)foreseen difficulties and costs that create legacies which pattern 
institutional evolution. Such challenges are amplified and sharpened in the 
financially straightened context of austerity projects as government 
departments lose experienced staff and struggle for resources. Complex and 
uncertain processes of state dismantling raise questions about how to 
disentangle and explain institutional operation and effects in specific 
geographical and temporal settings. How institutional establishment, legacies 
and trajectories inflect and shape their evolution in the context of particular 
state forms warrants historically literate approaches.   
 
Gaps in understanding institutional retrenchment and its governance 
geographies in austerity are especially evident in economic development 
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policy. An exception is Davidson and Ward’s (2014) analysis of the closure 
of the Redevelopment Agencies in California and the enduring 
consequences for city governments left to confront the legacies of 
depreciating assets, bad debts, liabilities and on-going project commitments. 
The disruptive effects of institutional restructuring linger as successor 
bodies attempt to grasp their particular local predicaments. Efforts to 
reorganise institutional and territorial architectures unleash episodes of 
uncertainty, fluidity and experimentation. Understanding the restructuring 
of institutional landscapes requires historical awareness of change and 
continuity in the legacies and ways in which previous paths, approaches and 
practices prefigure and condition the changed and emergent structures.  
 
The aim here is further to develop the conceptual and explanatory grasp of 
the governance geographies of austerity states and their emergence in 
variegated political economic contexts, the ways in which austerity is 
articulated and enacted by the participant actors, and the implications of 
institutional dismantling in particular public policy areas. The experience of 
England in the UK is the empirical case of the multi-scalar and specifically 
sub-national construction and articulation of an austerity state project within 
a centralised union-state structure. From 2010, the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government formulated, pursued and communicated a 
particular form of austerity state with an emergency-flavoured rhetoric, 
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focused upon deficit reduction and fiscal consolidation through sharp 
contractions in public expenditure, and restructuring and abolition of state 
institutions. The UK has relatively high and persistent levels of spatial 
disparities in economic and social conditions, and a history of unsettled 
economic development policy and shifting institutional arrangements 
between regional and local scales (Pike and Tomaney 2009).  
 
Answering calls for stronger and more comparable methods for analysing 
institutions and explaining their evolution over time and space (Rodríguez-
Pose 2013, Tomaney 2014), the research encompassed the abolition and 
closure of all nine RDAs across England including London. Addressing 
their relative neglect and implications for the emergent economic 
development landscape, the research is the first national study of the demise 
of the RDAs in England. The methodology and research design were based 
on two inter-connected parts: i) a systematic review of published secondary 
sources (e.g. RDA strategies, reports and accounts; Government documents; 
and independent studies); and, ii) semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
selected former RDA Chairs, Chief Executives, and officials and civil 
servants in national government departments. Rather than simply describe 
the process from the perspective of those involved, the research and 
analysis focused upon explaining: the role of the geographies and histories 
of institutional antecedents in shaping the introduction and evolution of the 
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RDAs; the emergent austerity state and the politics of the actors’ critique of 
the RDAs; the construction and articulation of the austerity state project 
and the restructuring of economic development governance by actors in the 
UK Coalition government; the construction and contestation of the case for 
RDA abolition and closure; the institutional dismantling of RDAs through 
legislative change and implementing the ‘RDA Transition and Closure 
Programme’; and, the enduring legacies and implications of the demise of 
the RDAs in the austerity state and landscape of economic development 
governance in England. 
 
 
3. The geographies and histories of institutional antecedents: the 
introduction and evolution of the RDAs in England 
Reflecting the geographically sensitive and historically literate approach to 
explaining their demise, it is important to situate the RDA era in England 
within an unfolding trajectory of unsettled institutional arrangements for 
economic development governance, oscillating between regional and local 
forms in the post-war period (Pike et al. 2015). An episode of state rescaling 
to the regional level began with establishment of the Government Offices 
for the Regions by the then Conservative government in 1994 (Figure 
1)(MacLeod and Jones 1997).  
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< Figure 1 > 
 
Following the election of the Labour government in 1997, as part of Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott’s regional project the RDAs were established 
as executive Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) by the Regional 
Development Agencies Act in 1998. Alongside Government Offices for the 
Regions, representing national departments, and indirectly elected Regional 
Chambers, providing strategic co-ordination and democratic oversight, the 
RDAs constituted a regional governance structure for England (Sandford 
2006). Tasked to “increase economic growth in each region” (Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 2011: 1), the statutory purposes of 
the RDAs were defined:  
 
(a) to further the economic development and the regeneration of its 
area, (b) to promote business efficiency, investment and 
competitiveness in its area, (c) to promote employment in its area, (d) 
to enhance the development and application of skills relevant to 
employment in its area, and (e) to contribute to the achievement of 
sustainable development in the United Kingdom where it is relevant 
to its area to do so (HM Government 1998: 2).  
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Demonstrating the explanatory importance of institutional histories and 
geographies, the nature of the introduction and situation of the RDAs 
within the UK state apparatus shaped their evolution. First, RDAs were 
established as the lead and “strategic arms-length bodies” (BIS 2012: 12) for 
economic development across England. This policy area holds no clear or 
stable definition in central government and is fragmented across the 
responsibilities of several departments. Propelled by the reformist zeal of 
the new Labour Government and the then Deputy Prime Minister John 
Prescott, as the focus for sub-national economic development the RDAs 
pursued policy interventions focused on business, people and place, and  
accumulated a widening array of responsibilities over their lifespan (Table 
1). As flagships of Prescott’s regional project, RDAs found it politically 
difficult and were unable to decline the delegation of further responsibilities 
and resources from central government, although some actively lobbied for 
them. RDAs’ broadening remit embedded tensions in their role and focus 
that shaped their evolution: between economic and social development; 
focus and breadth; strategy and delivery; regional and national; action and 
reaction; and, long and short-term (National Audit Office (NAO) 2003). 
 
< Table 1 > 
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Second, institutional geographies prefigured the evolution of the RDAs as 
they were established in every region in England. Contrary to the European 
model of establishing RDAs only in economically weaker regions (Bellini et 
al. 2012), the Labour Government followed the recommendation of its 
Regional Policy Commission (1996). Inspired by New Economic 
Geography ideas that government commitments to reduce spatial 
inequalities were perverse, RDA establishment followed the endogenous 
development model and its emphasis upon building regional institutional 
capacity (Agnew 2015). Articulated in the metaphor of “all parts of all our 
regions firing on all cylinders” (Stephen Byers, then Industry Secretary, 
quoted in Wintour 2001: 1), RDAs were created in all English regions 
including London and the prosperous parts of the East and South East 
(Figure 2). Concerns were expressed that this geographically 
undifferentiated approach was “treating unequals equally” and “hardly a 
recipe for promoting equality” by reducing disparities in regional economic 
growth rates (Morgan 2002: 804). The political map of England meant 
especially the Conservative-led local government in southern and eastern 
regions viewed the new RDAs with suspicion and even hostility as 
unaccountable creatures of the Labour Government with “no regional 
identity and uniformity…strange geography…taking power and influence 
away from them…the RDAs were doomed from the start…once the 
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decision was made to give all regions a RDA” (Former RDA Chair, 
Authors’ Interview, 2014)(Table 2). 
 
< Figure 2 and Table 2 > 
 
Last, the London Development Agency (LDA) was distinct and sat within 
different governance arrangements involving the Mayor, Greater London 
Authority (GLA) and London Assembly (LA). These more democratically 
accountable state structures as well as London’s greater economic 
development potential meant the LDA evolved along a different trajectory 
from the other RDAs, culminating in its separate abolition arrangements. 
 
 
3.1 The emergent austerity state and the politics of the critique of 
the RDAs 
In the wake of the crisis and economic downturn from 2008, the RDAs 
acquired yet further responsibilities as lead institutions for Labour’s then 
Secretary of State for Business Peter Mandelson’s ‘industrial activism’ and 
recovery plan. In common with the struggles of other states internationally 
to cope with the economic shock, UK state borrowing rose sharply to fund 
stabilisation measures (Kitson et al. 2011). Conservative diagnosis of the 
UK’s predicament blamed the legacy and ineffectiveness of Labour’s 
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profligate tax and debt state and presaged the turn to austerity as the central 
project of state restructuring (Schäfer and Streeck 2013).  
 
In this context of an emergent austerity state project and the run-up to the 
UK general election in 2010, the politics heated up as the opposition parties 
articulated their own assessments of RDAs and proposals for reform. The 
Conservative Party (2010: 74) criticised the “distant and remote tier of 
ineffective regional government” imposed centrally by Labour as “an 
artificial construct that serves only to add layers of bureaucracy and 
complicate the job of local government” (2009: 29). They argued that RDAs 
contributed to a “bureaucratic and undemocratic tier of regional planning” 
(2009: 4) and “regional imbalances have got worse over the last decade, 
despite billions of pounds spent” (2010: 23). The Conservatives proposed to 
“curtail the quango state” and, in a state rescaling project, to pursue 
decentralisation and localism focused upon “returning power” (2010: 70) to 
democratically accountable local authorities and local communities. Their 
manifesto proposed to “give councils and businesses the power to form 
their own business-led local enterprise partnerships instead of RDAs” while 
allowing “Where local councils and businesses want to maintain regionally-
based enterprise partnerships, they will be able to” (2010: 24-25). The 
Liberal Democrats (2010: 26) proposed refocusing the RDAs “solely on 
economic development, removing duplication with other parts of 
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government and allowing substantial budget reductions”, shifting 
responsibility for economic development to local authorities, and allowing 
RDAs to remain where they had “strong local support” and without it to 
“be scrapped and their functions taken over by local authorities.” In 
government, Labour abolished Regional Chambers and offered a new 
regional growth initiative for RDAs and enhanced role for Regional 
Ministers but their focus and project for state rescaling was already shifting 
toward city-regions and larger, pan-regional institutions such as ‘The 
Northern Way’ across northern England (MacLeod and Jones 1997). 
Pushed by city leaders with greater “political nous” and connections than 
the RDAs, this changing institutional and geographical focus meant “some 
of the writing was on the wall before you got to 2010” (Former RDA 
Chairman, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
 
3.2 Constructing and articulating the austerity state and 
restructuring the governance of economic development 
The inconclusive 2010 general election eventually led to the formation of a 
Conservative-led coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The 
particular version of austerity state constructed prioritised deficit reduction 
delivered through state restructuring and a programme of public 
expenditure reductions (80%) and tax increases (20%): “It means the State 
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doing things differently. It’s about trying to get the outputs we are looking 
for with less money to go around” (Danny Alexander, Liberal Democrat, 
then Chief Secretary to HM Treasury (HMT), 2013)(Figure 3). The 
overriding rationale and imperative for austerity and deficit reduction was 
articulated in Conservative Chancellor George Osborne’s (2010: 1) 
‘Emergency Budget’ because “Countries that cannot live within their means 
face higher interest rates, greater economic shocks and larger debt interest 
bills”. With education, health and overseas aid ring-fenced, public 
expenditure reductions were concentrated in other central government 
departments. Those departments responsible for the RDAs – BIS and 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) – faced reductions of 46% and 
68% (capital) and 27% and 67% (revenue) respectively between 2010/11-
2014/15 (IFS 2013). 
 
Constructions and articulations of particular austerity state projects are not 
fixed and stable entities that unfold inevitably; they are fluid and unstable 
endeavours which certain actors attempt to initiate, establish momentum 
for, and push through often amidst doubt, disagreement and dissent. 
Indeed, the initial austerity discourse in the Coalition Agreement left an 
opening for RDA retention and reform in supporting: “the creation of Local 
Enterprise Partnerships…to replace Regional Development 
Agencies…These may take the form of the existing RDAs in areas where 
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they are popular” (HM Government 2010: 10). However, as the crisis 
rhetoric was ramped-up to propel and reinforce the austerity imperative and 
the Conservatives grasped the unique opportunity to undertake irrevocable 
state contraction and rationalisation, the abolition of all the RDAs was 
formally announced in the ‘Emergency Budget’ in June 2010.  
 
< Figure 3 > 
 
As part of the state’s ‘strategic selectivity’ in prioritising restructuring and 
deficit reduction (Jones 1997), the Government launched a review of public 
bodies. Appealing to Schäfer and Streeck’s (2013) people constituency of 
the austerity state by seeking to abolish unaccountable bodies spending tax 
payers’ money, the review was initially dubbed a ‘bonfire of the 
QUANGOS’ capable of generating estimated savings of over £2.5bn. As an 
institutional legacy from the Labour government, RDAs were prominent 
QUANGOs ripe for abolition by the Coalition Government. 
 
Articulating particular definitions of ‘decentralisation’, ‘localism’ and 
‘rebalancing’ for the restructuring of economic development governance, 
the Coalition Government’s ‘Local Growth’ agenda sought “a fairer and 
more balanced economy that is not so dependent on a narrow range of 
economic sectors…driven by private sector growth”, and “has new business 
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opportunities that are more evenly balanced across the country and between 
industries” (BIS 2010a: 5). Prescott’s regional project was characterised as 
“too centralised” (BIS 2010c: 27), over-emphasised planning and “failed as 
it went against the grain of markets. Regional and other strategies stifled 
natural and healthy competition between places and inhibited growth” (BIS 
2010a: 7). Then Secretary of State for CLG, Eric Pickles, argued: 
 
If you want to rebuild a fragile national economy you don’t strangle 
business with red tape and let bloated regional quangos make all the 
decisions. Urgent action is needed to rebuild and rebalance local 
economies…The solution needs to be local…By giving up central 
control we will put democratic accountability back into the local 
economy making it responsive to the needs of local business and 
local people (quoted in BIS 2010b: 1). 
 
The Coalition Government’s ‘Local Growth’ agenda involved, first, shifting 
powers to business, local government and community actors at the local 
level through the invitation to form ‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs) 
so that “where the drivers of growth are local, decisions [are] made locally” 
(BIS 2010a: 5). This state rescaling presaged abolition of the regional tier of 
the Regional Government Offices, Regional Chambers and RDAs 
(Sandford 2013). Second, efficient and dynamic markets and increased 
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confidence for investors were sought through planning reform and local 
government incentives. Last, new competitive initiatives were introduced 
with lower levels of funding including Regional Growth Fund, Growing 
Places Fund, Enterprise Zones and City Deals (NAO 2014).   
 
 
3.3 Constructing and contesting the case for RDA abolition and 
closure 
Propelled by the imperative of pushing through their particular version of 
the austerity state and keen to create an overwhelming case for reform, 
actors in Government, parliament and the civil service articulated their 
arguments for RDA abolition and closure. First, allegedly indicative of the 
bureaucratic tax and debt state, RDAs were said to have accumulated too 
many powers and responsibilities (Table 1). Such “mission creep” (House of 
Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Committee 2010: 10) meant their 
interpretation of economic development and role became too broad, 
diluting their focus and undermining their effectiveness. The joint statutory 
planning responsibility with local authorities in 2008 represented for many, 
including the sceptical local government community and RDA officials, ‘a 
step too far’ for a NDPB (Clarke 2012). RDA leaders countered that 
increased responsibilities were foisted upon them by central government, 
and integrating key levers for economic development within a single 
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institution with a long-term strategy, governance structure, staff, integrated 
and multi-annual budgets, and scale provided an effective organisational 
model.   
 
Second, held up against a yardstick of policy delivery and effectiveness in 
the manner of the ‘new public management’ (Hood and Peters 2004), RDAs 
were charged with failing to deliver the Labour Government’s cross-
departmental Public Service Agreement (PSA 2) target to reduce the gap in 
economic growth rates between regions (HMT, DTI and CLG 2003). Then 
BIS Minister Mark Prisk (2010: 1) argued “the economic divide between the 
Greater South East and the rest of England is as wide today as when RDAs 
began their work. That, by any measure, is a failed policy”. As lead regional 
economic development institutions, RDAs were responsible for delivering 
PSA 2 for their sponsor departments BIS, CLG and HM Treasury. Yet, each 
RDA’s statutory purpose was to increase economic growth in their regional 
economy not reduce the gap in growth rates between regional economies. 
RDAs had other specific and broader accountabilities too that sat uneasily 
with PSA 2: departmental guidance; ‘State of the Region’ and ‘Activity’ 
indicators, tiered objectives, targets and milestones; and Regional Economic 
Strategies. Controlling less than 1% of total public expenditure within their 
regions (Table 3), it was considered unrealistic to expect RDAs to exert 
much influence upon longstanding “structural differences” in geographies 
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and levels of economic growth (Senior BIS Official, Author’s Interview, 
2014) and, in practice, PSA 2 was recognised as aspirational and a means to 
focus central government attention on regional issues. BIS (2010c: 26) even 
accepted “substantial limits in how geographically balanced an economy can 
become” and how “the increase in economic disparities seems long-term 
and linked to globalisation”.  
 
< Table 3 > 
 
Third, the state rescaling project condemned the RDA geography of 
Government Office Regions as an inappropriate spatial scale because it was 
“based on administrative regions that did not always reflect real functional 
economic areas” (BIS 2010a: 13). Underpinned by the emphasis of ‘New 
Economic Geography’ and urban economics upon facilitating external 
economies of agglomeration, ‘functional economic areas’ (FEAs) “over 
which the relevant market operates” were preferred for the new LEP 
geographies “to deliver economic development activities at the most 
appropriate level to maximise their impact” (BIS 2010c: 29). RDAs were at 
best groupings of FEAs, simply due to their size, and many deployed sub-
regional structures which recognized FEAs such as city-regions. Indeed, 
reflecting the intractability of matching institutional structures to inherently 
shifting economic geographies (Jones 2014), over half of the 39 LEPs have 
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boundaries that are difficult to reconcile with recognized FEAs (Table 4). 
Demonstrating the mixing of technocracy and politics in the austerity state, 
BIS and CLG (2010) acknowledged this mismatch and noted that in 
assessing potential LEP boundaries they considered other qualitative and 
more subjective factors including business leadership, local authority 
support, value added and ambition.  
 
< Table 4 > 
 
Fourth, as an acute issue for the austerity state project and its focus on 
public expenditure reductions, RDAs were criticised for being “particularly 
expensive” (The Conservative Party 2009: 5) and over-staffed. Prime 
Minister David Cameron (2010: col. 869) claimed money had been “wasted” 
on overseas offices and expenses, and “proper control of costs and 
spending” was needed. Then RDA ‘Chair of Chairs’, Sir Harry Studholme, 
countered that around 10% of RDA funding had been spent on 
administrative costs in 2007/08-2009/10 which “compares very favourably 
with organisations past and present carrying out similar functions” (quoted 
in Cook 2010: 1). The Chief Executive of the Cumbria Chamber of 
Commerce argued RDAs were “overstaffed, underachieving…the epitome 
of the wasteful, spendthrift Labour regime” (Johnston 2010: 1). 
Campaigners the Tax Payer’s Alliance (2010: 1) further asserted that RDAs 
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were an “unnecessary and expensive layer of bureaucracy that stifle genuine 
private enterprise”. Detailing how they “shared a combined single pot 
budget of £21bn”, employed “around 3,000 staff” (Tables 5 and 6), BIS 
(2010a: 18, 13) concluded RDAs and the regional tier “involved significant 
complexity and duplication of responsibilities, which led to increased costs 
to the public purse”. In the Coalition’s austerity state, it was considered “no 
longer possible to fund the RDAs or other comparable bodies at their 
previous level” (BIS 2011:1). However, central government actors offered 
no yardsticks against which to assess claims of over-generous funding, 
profligacy, waste, and over-staffing.  
 
< Tables 5 and 6 > 
 
Fifth, as anathema to the Coalition’s ambitions for decentralisation and 
localism as NDPBs, BIS (2010a: 7) claimed RDAs lacked local 
accountability and “local partners did not feel empowered to lead action to 
improve economic growth”. Further, RDAs were portrayed as remote, 
unresponsive and “largely ignored the knowledge and the expertise” of the 
private sector, local authorities and local communities (BIS 2010a: 7). 
RDAs’ joint role in statutory planning sharpened accountability concerns, 
especially in politically hostile southern regions. RDA leaders argued they 
were “much more in the goldfish bowl than some government bodies” 
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(Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 2014) and had multiple 
accountabilities: to Ministers of State in BIS and CLG; to Members of 
Parliament through departmental Select Committees; to HM Treasury and 
the National Audit Office as NDPBs; and, to their Boards (including elected 
local authority leaders) and financial auditors. Yet, accountability within 
their regions was their “Achilles heel” (Former RDA Chief Executive, 
Authors’ Interview, 2014) because of the relatively weak oversight and 
scrutiny exercised by the indirectly elected Regional Chambers, Leaders’ 
Boards and Regional Select Committees, and rejection of the Elected 
Regional Assemblies in the North East referendum in 2004 (Sandford 
2006). 
 
Sixth, questioning the role of state intervention and its “effectiveness” 
(NAO 2014: 16) under austerity, RDA performance and value for money 
were questioned. Reflecting their institutional evolution and history, the 
Labour government had already asked “what sort of value RDAs were 
delivering” (Former RDA Chairman, Authors’ Interview, 2014). As 
inherently political assessment exercises (Valler 2012), evaluations of RDAs 
were contested. Given their wide and broadening responsibilities, RDAs 
were difficult to evaluate. PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Department of 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (PwC/BERR) (2009: ii) found 
that between 2002/03 and 2006/07 “RDAs collectively exceeded their 
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targets, particularly for businesses created and people assisted in skills 
development…individual RDAs achieved their annual targets for each of 
the outputs on over 90% of occasions” and, overall, “every £1 of RDA 
spend will add £4.50 to regional GVA”. The NAO (2010: 7) stated 
“regional economic wealth generated as a result of jobs created by the 
RDAs’ support to physical regeneration shows benefits of £3.30 per £1 of 
actual costs incurred” and “it is reasonable to conclude that the RDAs’ 
activities have been beneficial overall”. In contrast, BIS (2011: 6) concluded 
“Despite demonstrating a positive impact for some RDA expenditure, the 
[PwC/BERR] report did not make a conclusive case that RDAs operated 
more effectively than any alternative approach”. Overman (2011: 21) 
questioned the PwC/BERR cost-benefit ratio as “high” and unlikely to have 
properly isolated deadweight and additionality effects, and claimed “no 
compelling evidence” exists on whether RDAs “are a good or bad thing”. 
RDA leaders accepted the inevitable unevenness in the effectiveness of their 
interventions, and claimed their role was longer-term, strategic, innovative 
and experimental in addressing structural economic problems (Former RDA 
Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
Last, as vestiges of Prescott’s regional project, the RDAs were victims of “a 
raw political decision” by actors in the coalition government (Former RDA 
Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 2014). RDA leaders considered the 
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judgement was made without objective analysis of the evidence because 
“Westminster politicians were moving on to other things, city-regions, and 
there was no-one certainly not of any prominence making the case for 
continuing with the existing economic institutions…when it came to the 
crunch, RDA advocates were not thick on the ground” (Former RDA 
Chairman, Authors’ Interview, 2014). Territorial political economy was 
evident for some because RDA abolition was “more about the politics of 
the South East than the economics of the North East” (Paul Callaghan, 
former RDA Chair, quoted in Pearson 2010: 1). While initially Liberal 
Democrats in the coalition sought RDA retention in regions that needed 
and supported them, albeit with reduced responsibilities and resources, the 
more powerful Conservative factions won the argument. The closure 
decision was taken by central government actors to “empower local 
partners, deliver significantly better value for money and generate large cost 
savings which will reduce the deficit” (BIS 2011: 1). For RDA leaders, 
despite the articulation of austerity, “it was never to do with the money” 
(Former RDA Chair, Authors’ Interview, 2014) because “[CLG Secretary of 
State, Eric] Pickles wanted to abolish the agencies because he hated regions. 
Period. He didn’t think it through” (RDA Chief Executive quoted in 
Hayman 2010: 1). RDA abolition was an “early scalp” for the Conservatives’ 
austerity and state restructuring project, “anti-regionalism” and dislike of 
Labour’s regional tier, fuelled by concerns about their involvement as 
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NDPBs in planning decisions with Conservative-led local authorities in 
southern England (Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 
2014). In its mandatory cost-benefit analysis of the policy change, BIS 
(2011) presented a negative ‘Total Net Present Value’ (-£3,447m) rather than 
the positive figure required by HM Treasury, partly explained by the hiatus in 
establishing the new local funding initiatives and institutions. 
 
 
3.4 Institutional dismantling in motion: changing the law and 
implementing the ‘RDA Transition and Closure Programme’  
Amidst contestation from opposition Labour politicians and disquiet 
amongst some Conservatives and Liberal Democrat coalition partners, the 
particular version of the austerity state articulated by Conservative 
Chancellor George Osborne proved decisive. Established in statute, RDA 
abolition required an Act of Parliament. In the Public Bodies Reform Bill, 
the RDAs (except the LDA) were identified as “No longer an NDPB - 
RDAs will be abolished and functions which are to be retained will be 
transferred to central or local government and others” (Cabinet Office 2011: 
4). Within regions, non-statutory Multi-Area Agreements, City Region 
Pilots, Urban Regeneration Companies and City Development Companies 
were abolished too as part of the institutional rationalisation (NAO 2014). 
Demonstrating the abandonment of democratic process as part of the 
 33 
austerity state’s overriding financial imperatives (Donald et al. 2014), 
concerns were expressed about the pre-emption of Parliament in the 
government’s Public Bodies Reform programme and the constitutional 
legalities of the “pre-legislative implementation” of the Bill without 
consultation and Royal Assent (Beecham 2014: 1). 
 
Given London’s particular governance arrangements and place within the 
UK’s national political economy, the LDA (2010: 1) and its assets and 
liabilities were handled through the Localism Act and “folded into” the 
GLA, supporting its new responsibilities for housing and regeneration, and 
enabling Mayoral designation of Development Corporations. CLG (2011: 5) 
argued this “decentralises power and streamlines London’s governance 
architecture” to improve efficiency, accountability and enable London 
government to address its economic development, housing and regeneration 
challenges.  
 
Reflecting the aims of the austerity project to deliver abolition and the lack 
of historical precedents for institutional dismantling, the ‘RDA Transition 
and Closure Programme’ was established to handle staff transfers, manage 
out assets and liabilities, sustain RDA performance during function transfers 
and minimize transition impacts, ensure RDA governance arrangements 
during transition met Ministerial oversight and control requirements, 
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minimize transition costs, and manage out residual business effectively (BIS 
2012). Rejecting BIS’s option of contracting-out to an international 
consultancy as “akin to bringing the receivers in…as if a business went 
bust” (Former RDA Chair, Authors’ Interview, 2014), given their 
knowledge and the risks to reputational capital the RDA leaders insisted 
upon a leading role in managing the transition and closure process “within 
the RDAs and its governance outside of the RDAs” (BIS 2012: 15). Chairs, 
Boards and Executives were retained in each RDA with responsibility for 
their wind-up. A National Transition Board (NTB) was established to 
oversee the programme involving the RDAs (‘Chair of Chairs’ and 3 RDA 
Chief Executives), key government departments (BIS, CLG, and HMT), 
Homes and Communities Agency, legal and finance support, and the NAO. 
Reflecting the particular civil service culture of the UK state, for the RDA 
leaders on the NTB, “once politically the decision was made…everyone was 
pragmatic and realistic…committed to work in a professional manner to 
manage the process, take care of staff and do the best for the regions to 
leave good legacy behind” (Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ 
Interview, 2014). 
 
Involving organisations across England, over 3,000 staff, £1.2bn of 
programme commitments and over £500m of land assets and liabilities, “the 
orderly, cost effective, solvent and compliant closure of the eight RDAs 
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outside London” was a “significant challenge” for BIS officials and RDA 
staff especially in the context of austerity (BIS 2012: 5). This state 
restructuring was decided upon and forced through despite previous 
assessments of institutional dismantling identifying poor value for money 
because of unclear objectives, limited cost and benefit monitoring, and poor 
implementation planning (NAO 2012). 
 
As centralist and localist tensions buffeted the rescaling plans in the 
Government’s austerity project, ‘Local Growth’ agenda and coalition politics 
between Ministers, several RDA functions were considered “best led 
nationally” (Cable and Pickles 2010: 1) and centralised in national 
government departments and agencies. These comprised: business support 
(BIS); R&D and innovation (Technology Strategy Board, BIS); inward 
investment and international trade (UK Trade International, subsequently 
contracted-out to PA Consulting); EU funding (CLG and DEFRA); sector 
leadership (BIS); access to finance including venture capital funds (BIS); 
adult skills provision (Skills Funding Agency); and, rapid responses to 
economic shocks (BIS). The Homes and Communities Agency was 
rationalized and retained responsibility for physical regeneration and 
housing. RDA leaders found this centralization contradictory: “It’s all about 
localism but functions ended up in national government or national private 
organisations” (Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
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Further, Government identified “a number of current functions provided by 
RDAs that will simply stop” (BIS 2010a: 17): regional economic and spatial 
strategies, Grants for Business Investment, regional workforce skills 
strategies, and selected sectoral activities. 
 
In the sharpened context of austerity, the disposal, sale and transfer of RDA 
assets and liabilities were critical to the financial outcomes of the transition 
and closure programme. The asset base was valued at around £500m, one 
third of which was land and property holdings. One fifth was released for 
sale at ‘market value’ in early 2011. While local authorities had first refusal, 
purchases had to be at “full market value” with no “gifting” of properties 
through asset transfer or deferred “buy now, pay later” deals (Werran 2011: 
1). In London, LDA assets were transferred to the Mayor and GLA. Then 
Shadow Business Minister, Gordon Marsden, bemoaned the “fire sale” with 
local authorities under austerity unable to pay market rates, and the new 
LEPs lacking the resources, powers and accountable institutional structures 
to benefit (quoted in Werran 2011: 1). Most remaining RDA land and 
property assets, worth around £300m, transferred to the Homes and 
Communities Agency later in 2011. 
 
Despite the complexity and unevenness of institutional dismantling as part 
of the austerity state project, the RDAs ceased operation on schedule on 31 
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March 2012. On 1 July 2012, formal abolition was enacted through the 
Public Bodies Act 2011. Following “lengthy negotiations” over functions 
and staffing, the Portfolio Management Office (PMO) residuary body was 
established to handle remaining RDA interests (BIS 2012: 27). The PMO’s 
late arrival generated “anxiety among the RDAs as their resources necessary 
to run assets and affect transfers dwindled” (BIS 2012: 27). 
 
 
3.5 The legacies and implications of institutional dismantling in 
the austerity state: after the RDAs and the emergent landscape of 
economic development governance in England  
As economic development in the UK is “non-statutory for local authorities 
and central government” and “gets kicked around as a political football” 
(Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview, 2014), its restructuring 
under the austerity state project constructed and rolled-out from 2010 has 
been far reaching, complicated and messy. In contrast to the historically 
“incremental and overlapping” approaches in England, this episode of 
reorganisation involved almost complete removal of existing programmes 
and their replacement with new arrangements and funding mechanisms 
(NAO 2014: 16, 7)(Figure 4). While actors in Government wanted “an 
orderly transition from RDAs to the new delivery landscape” (BIS 2010a: 
18), the NAO (2014: 10) concluded “this has not been achieved”. The 
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‘RDA Transition and Closure Programme’ proceeded “effectively” and “as 
planned” with efficient upward transfer of responsibilities to central 
government departments and agencies but downward transfer to the new 
local institutions was conceived and introduced gradually in a different time 
frame (NAO 2014: 10). The ineffectiveness of this state rescaling was 
exacerbated by government’s lack of a “single definition of local growth 
policy” and a “co-ordinated national programme with a common strategy, 
set of objectives and implementation plan” (NAO 2014: 3, 11). For RDA 
leaders, the “succession, who are you handing things across to was a 
complete bloody shambles” (Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ 
Interview, 2014). Reflecting tensions between centralism and localism cross-
cutting the actors’ austerity state project, institutional change since 2010 has 
been a disorderly, rapid and largely unplanned unfolding and accretion of 
additional initiatives, funds and responsibilities under the new arrangements 
(Pike et al. 2015). Then BIS Secretary of State, Liberal Democrat Vince 
Cable acknowledged that “getting rid of the RDAs and bringing in LEPs has 
perhaps been a little Maoist and chaotic” (quoted in Stratton 2010: 1). RDA 
leaders called it “horrendously complex” (RDA Chief Executive quoted in 
Hayman 2010: 1).  
 
< Figure 4 > 
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While a central rationale for abolition under austerity, actual RDA wind-up 
and closure costs and savings remain unclear. BIS (2011) estimated total 
costs (present value) of the RDAs of £17bn for 1999-2011, and transition 
costs of £287m (constant prices). By 2012, BIS (2012) claimed actual 
transition costs were £364m but were £100m less than budgeted. HM 
Treasury (2010) estimated savings of £2.3 billion per annum. Lack of public 
access to the data and calculations, and independent valuation hinder 
analysis of these differing and shifting assessments. The House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee (2012) expressed concerns about 
implementation, value for money, and staff, expertise and asset transfer 
from RDAs to LEPs. Uncertainty remains regarding estimates and 
responsibility for the RDAs’ current and historic liabilities of up to £1.5bn 
including land remediation and on-going public-private partnerships. RDA 
funding structures generated legacies that complicated the closure process 
with four government departments involved and projects, assets and 
liabilities transferred to different institutions on different timescales (BIS 
2012). RDAs had 15 to 20-year time horizons extending beyond 5-year 
political cycles and making them difficult to wind-down because “whether 
the [BIS or CLG] department takes [the liabilities]…on or a residuary body 
they have to sit on someone’s books (“Whitehall insider” quoted in Hayman 
2010: 1). Further and often unplanned costs arose from staff redundancy 
payments, pensions, lease terminations, finance contracts, knowledge 
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management, and interests in arms-lengths companies. Despite the 
sharpened financial imperatives of the austerity state, the closure of the 
RDAs echoes previous episodes of institutional dismantling in England, 
such as the Urban Development Corporations (NAO 2002), with the actors 
involved over-estimating potential savings to underpin change rationales and 
underestimating eventual costs. 
 
By 2013/14, the costs and savings picture was becoming clearer. Delivering 
on the Government’s austerity state project, RDA abolition enabled a public 
expenditure reduction of £4.9bn (Figure 5). Between 2010/11-2014/15, 
planned spend was £6.3bn, comprising £2.4bn by the RDAs and their 
legacy, and £3.9bn by the new institutions and initiatives (NAO 2014). 
Reduction in RDA spending started in 2010/11, falling to £585m in 
2011/12 following their closure (excluding severance payments and asset 
transfers) while £230m was spent in 2011/12 for activity transfers (NAO 
2014). A further £94m was scheduled for handling RDA legacy issues for 
2012/13-2014/15. Funding in the new landscape has to be seen against the 
estimated total RDA wind-up costs of £1.5bn (Hayman 2010). 
 
< Figure 5 > 
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Demonstrating the enduring effects of state restructuring and institutional 
dismantling under austerity, further implications and legacies have been 
unfolding in the wake of the RDAs’ demise. Amidst recession and uneven 
recovery, misgivings were voiced across the political spectrum and private 
and public sectors. Senior Conservative Lord Heseltine (2011: 1) called 
abolition a “mistake” because of the bridge RDAs provided between 
localities and central government, and warned government departments 
were re-introducing co-ordinating structures at the regional level with 
different geographies to manage their local engagement. Business leaders 
too expressed doubts: “[RDAs] had the authority to make things happen. 
They had money and power. It gave them the leadership and authority to 
speak on the region’s behalf” (Chief Executive of the North East Chamber 
of Commerce, quoted in Tighe 2012: 1). Seemingly keen to sidestep the role 
of politics in territorial development, RDA leaders bemoaned the loss of a 
“coherent and strategic approach” provided by a regional institution with 
“clearly defined responsibilities and the ability to make broader and more 
strategic and bolder decisions and not be bogged down in the political 
world” (Former RDA Chief Executive, Authors’ Interview 2104). 
 
Unfolding short-term effects and slower burn legacies from the RDAs’ 
demise are shaping the landscape for successor institutions. Coping with 
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RDA closure and transition to the new governance arrangements, local and 
regional actors have faced:  
 
Weaker strategic leadership, increased centralism and far less 
devolution…Lots of momentum lost, expertise diluted somewhat, 
confidence and finance to spend has been gone in what was a critical 
time…a lot of drift, lack of momentum and less confidence… Good 
quality people doing good work – more fragmented, less impactful, 
less of the big bold stuff going on (Former RDA Chief Executive, 
Authors’ Interview, 2014). 
 
Further on-going issues include: the labour market impacts of the 
redundancies of over 3,000 former RDA staff since less than 500 were 
transferred to new roles (BIS 2012); the splintered knowledge base and 
networks discarded through redundant staff and information systems; loss 
of experience and coordination across functions (BIS 2011: 2); written-off 
investment in staff training and research; costs and uncertainties dealing 
with RDAs during closure; disruption and gaps in service delivery (BIS 
2011); and, the new LEPs starting economic development strategy afresh in 
rescaled geographies (Pike et al. 2015). 
 
 
 43 
4. Conclusions 
Advancing the governance geographies of austerity research agenda, the 
purpose here has been to strengthen conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
to explain how, why and in what forms austerity states are constructed by 
actors in particular political-economic settings and geographical and 
temporal contexts, how and by whom they are expressed and enacted, and 
how they are unfolded through the institutional and territorial apparatus of 
the state and public policy. Empirical analysis and explanation of the 
construction of a particular austerity state project by actors in the UK 
coalition government from 2010 and the abolition and closure of the RDAs 
in England has been informed by and fed into conceptual and theoretical 
development.  
 
Engaging lacunae in the emergent and cross-disciplinary work, three specific 
contributions have been made. First, a qualitative and plural conception of 
austerity states provided a more nuanced explanation of the emergence of 
state types and their evolution. This framework sought deeper 
understanding of the particular ways in which specific austerity state projects 
are constructed and pursued by actors within the political economies of 
certain geographical variegations of capitalism. Such political projects appear 
fluid, unstable, temporary and even contingent. Distinct versions of austerity 
states involve multiple actors working in different territorial scales and 
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relational networks, their composition of logics and narratives, and their 
patchy, irregular and dishevelled implementation efforts. Rather than 
analysing states as somehow remote, inert and passive institutions, in this 
approach the agency of state and non-state actors is integral to fomenting, 
pursuing and implementing state restructuring. Addressing the limited 
analysis of institutional and state failure to date (Jessop 2013), the UK 
Government’s abolition of the RDAs in England demonstrated how ‘failure’ 
was articulated and imposed by certain powerful actors, especially in HM 
Treasury, on a specific set of institutions in the discursive construction of 
the arguments of RDA ineffectiveness and the imperative for abolition and 
closure. While austerity is typically presented by actors in austerity states as a 
value-free and technocratic solution to the fiscal profligacy of the Keynesian 
tax and debt state (Donald et al. 2014), the questionable rationales, limited 
analysis and evidence collated and articulated by actors to support the UK 
government’s decision to abolish the RDAs in England is illuminating. It 
demonstrates how power, ideology and politics are exerted by certain actors 
over rationality, whereby narratives of austerity dominate even in an era 
claimed to be characterised by post-ideological ‘what works’ approaches and 
objective, evidence-based public policy-making (Rutter 2012). 
 
Second, the heightened geographical sensitivity and appreciation of 
(re)scaling contributed to remedying the nationally framed focus of existing 
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work on austerity states and broadening it to include and extend beyond the 
national scale. Multiple actors are shaping the geographically differentiated 
expressions of austerity states across spatial levels and in relational circuits. 
(Re)scaling is central to the statecraft of actors in austerity state projects as a 
tangible means to disrupt existing relations and institutional arrangements to 
foment, encourage and even force radical change. Yet, rather than following 
any predetermined and singular process in explaining state restructuring and 
rescaling, the abolition of the RDAs in England demonstrates how what 
Keating (2013) terms functional and institutional rescaling in austerity states is 
fragmented and unfolding in an array of different directions: not only 
decentralising from the national to the subnational but away from the 
regional towards the local and city/regional and, simultaneously, back to the 
national central level. In tension and accommodation, the empirical analysis 
reveals actors in austerity states are juggling opposing and contradictory 
tendencies. First are the rationales and politics of centralism in seeking 
tightly to control and change the extent and depth of state intervention and 
fiscal consolidation. Second, and at the same time, are the logics and politics 
of localism in trying to devolve responsibility for rationalisation and 
retrenchment and encourage innovation and ‘doing more with less’ through 
decentralisation within and beyond the state apparatus to the market, civic 
society, social group and individual. Research is only just beginning to 
consider such uneven governance geographies of austerity states. Much 
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further conceptual, theoretical and cross-national comparative empirical 
work is needed.   
 
Last, a historically literate approach to explaining the politics and 
restructuring of state institutions by actors and especially dismantling was 
explained. The empirical analysis demonstrated how legacies of institutional 
establishment sowed the seeds of future abolition and closure. Modification 
and persistence combine, fostering lasting endowments that configure 
institutional evolution. The establishment of RDAs in all of the English 
regions by actors in the Labour government enabled them to be viewed as a 
whole. The political unpopularity of RDAs in the more prosperous and 
Conservative governed southern regions fuelled the desires of national and 
local actors to dismantle all the RDAs even those with stronger political 
support and economic rationales in the less prosperous and Labour run 
northern regions. Rather than any kind of clear and surgical rationalisation 
and removal of unwanted parts of the territorial apparatus of the state, the 
experience of RDA abolition in England demonstrates institutional 
dismantling by actors in the financially constrained circumstances of 
austerity states with reduced state staff capacities and resources is chaotic, 
expensive, messy and uncertain: unable to deliver promised savings; 
generating unforeseen and unplanned costs and liabilities; reinforcing 
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institutional churn, instability and uncertainty; and, hampering the 
achievement of desired public policy outcomes. 
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Table 1: Additional responsibilities for the RDAs, 2000-2009 
 
 
2000 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Market 
Towns 
Initiative 
Manufacturing 
Advisory 
Service 
Regional 
Tourism 
Boards 
Selective 
Finance for 
Investment 
Business 
Link 
Olympic 
Games 
Preparation 
European 
Regional 
Development 
Funds 
(ERDF) 
RDAs asked 
by 
Government 
to play key 
roles in 
responding 
regionally to 
tackling the 
impacts of 
the Credit 
Crunch and 
recession 
RDAs take on 
statutory 
responsibility, 
with Regional 
Leaders’ 
Board, for the 
preparation of 
Single 
Integrated 
Regional 
Strategies (to 
encompass 
Spatial 
Planning) 
Farm Action 
Plan 
 Regional 
Skills 
Partnerships 
Broadband 
Aggregation 
Programme 
BREW 
(Business 
Research, 
Efficiency 
and Waste) 
Programme 
Rural 
Development 
Programme 
for England 
(RDPE) 
  RDAs 
become key 
partners in 
the 
Government’s 
New Industry, 
New Jobs 
Industrial 
Strategy 
Regional 
Development 
Grants 
  Statutory 
Consultee on 
Planning 
Decisions 
Modernising 
Rural 
Delivery 
    
   Rural Strategy Grants for 
R&D 
    
   Sustainable 
Farming and 
Food Strategy 
(Regional 
Implementation) 
     
   The Northern 
Way (Supported 
by 3 Northern 
RDAs) and 
partners in City 
Regions 
     
 
 
Source: Adapted from PwC/BERR (2009) and House of Commons Business and 
Enterprise Committee (2009)  
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Figure 2: RDAs in England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The RDA Network 
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Table 2: Political control (%) of local government by region, 2009 
 
Region Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Democrats 
Independent No 
Overall 
Control 
South East 82 1 7 1 8 
East of 
England 
73 4 10 0 13 
West 
Midlands 
70 3 0 0 27 
East 
Midlands 
67 11 9 4 9 
South West 56 0 5 5 34 
London 42 21 9 0 27 
North West 32 20 12 0 55 
Yorkshire 
and the 
Humber 
18 18 9 0 55 
North East 8 50 8 0 23 
England 59 10 8 1 23 
 
Source: Adapted from Centre for Cities (2009: 3) analysis based on LGA data 
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Figure 3: UK Government Revenues and Spending – with and without policy 
action* 
 
 
 
* TME = Total Managed Expenditure 
 
Source: Adapted from IFS (2014: 13) 
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Table 3: Comparison of RDA spending with total identified public expenditure by 
region, 2002/03-2006/07 
 
Business Place People SRB Other/hybrid National 
 
RDA* 
RDA 
Spending 
(£m) 
Local 
Authority 
Spending 
(£m) 
Central 
Government 
Spending 
(£m) 
Total 
Identified 
Public 
Spending 
(£m) 
RDA 
Spending 
as a % of 
Total 
Spending 
(%) 
AWM 1,504 50,300 117,701 168,002 0.9 
EEDA 522 46,451 106,156 152,607 0.3 
EMDA 858 36,358 88,924 125,282 0.7 
LDA 2,116 106,943 178,553 285,496 0.7 
NWDA 1,698 68,432 168,568 237,004 0.7 
ONE 1,334 26,721 65,191 91,912 1.5 
SEEDA 873 68,394 158,383 226,777 0.4 
SWRDA 766 42,162 106,834 148,997 0.5 
YF 1,564 46,449 117,407 163,855 1.0 
Total  11,234 492,212 1,107,717 1,599,930 0.7 
 
* Advantage West Midlands (AWM), East of England Development Agency (EEDA), 
East Midlands Development Agency (EMDA), London Development Agency (LDA), 
North West Development Agency (NWDA), One North East (ONE), South East of 
England Development Agency (SEEDA), South West Regional Development Agency 
(SWRDA) and Yorkshire Forward (YF). 
 
Source: Adapted from PwC/BERR (2009) 
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Table 4: Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and Functional Economic Areas 
(FEAs)* 
 
 Number % 
LEPs whose areas are close to being ‘1 for 1’ with Travel to 
Work Areas 
2 5.1 
LEPs whose areas are plausible as City Regions 15 38.5 
LEPs whose areas are of questionable validity as FEAs 22 56.4 
 
* Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) are the official definitions of British local labour 
market areas. England has no official ‘City Region’ definitions and those used in the 
analysis here are from Coombes (2014). LEPs as analysed here are those designated up to 
August 2013.  
 
Source: Authors’ research 
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Table 5: Regional Development Agencies Out-turns and Allocated Budgets, 2005-
06-2011/12 
 
 CSR 
2004 
  CSR 
2007 
 Allocated 
Budget 
Allocated 
Budget 
 2005-
06 
(£m) 
2006-
07(£m) 
2007-
08 
(£m) 
2008-
09 
(£m) 
2009-
10 
(£m) 
2010-2011 
(£m) 
2011-2012 
(£m) 
AWM 289 282 291 296 296 163 100 
EEDA 130 139 134 131 133 78 26 
EMDA 161 160 170 160 161 95 43 
LDA 396 416 386 346 376 275 174 
NWDA 383 402 390 383 393 234 111 
ONE 245 273 276 240 247 186 69 
SEEDA 167 172 162 160 166 96 38 
SWRDA 151 171 156 169 156 115 45 
YF 294 313 300 292 320 174 105 
Total 2,216 2,328 2,265 2,177 2,249 1,415 711 
 
Source: Calculated from BIS Regional Development Agency Out-turn Data 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/
economic-development/englands-regional-development-agencies/rda-finance-
and-governance 
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Table 6: Staff by RDA, 1999/00-2009/10* 
 
 
 1999-
00 
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
2008-
09 
2009-
10 
AWM 0 0 178 216 280 308 341 327 341 390 382 
EEDA 0 0 0 0 141 159 189 223 243 245 249 
EMDA 0 0 0 170 185 210 225 247 261 277 272 
LDA n/a 0 160 245 303 0 432 489 565 572 443 
NWDA 218 237 263 291 357 377 378 402 431 481 482 
ONE 258 244 240 249 347 376 418 446 437 410 399 
SEEDA 0 0 0 0 324 335 342 370 356 413 359 
SWRDA 176 180 197 227 238 259 277 303 348 362 339 
YF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 428 435 434 429 
Total 652 661 1038 1398 2175 2024 2602 3235 3417 3584 3354 
 
* Based on publicly available data. 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from RDA Annual Reports and Financial 
Statements 
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Figure 4: Initiatives for local growth in England, 1975-2015 
 
Source: Adapted from NAO (2014: 17) 
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Figure 5: Government spending on RDAs and new local growth funds and 
structures (£bn), 2005/06-2014/15* 
 
 
* Payments by departments. Spending by RDAs from Annual Reports and Accounts and 
excludes closure costs. Data for 2013/14 onwards is budget data. Earlier data is out-turn. 
Figures have been rounded. 
 
Source: Adapted from NAO (2014: 20) analysis of departmental data 
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